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Abstract 
 
 
In the years immediately after the 1994 genocide, Kigali was a site of continuing crisis amid 
extraordinary levels of urban population growth, as refugees returned to Rwanda in their 
millions. Yet unlike many post-conflict cities that spiral into endemic crime and instability, it 
was rapidly securitised in the context of political consolidation and large amounts of foreign 
aid, and hailed by the UN as a ‘model, modern city’. This paper analyses the government’s 
approach  to securitising  Kigali,  interrogating  how  its rapid  trajectory  from  epicentre  of 
conflict to carefully planned showcase for development  has been achieved. We argue that 
Kigali bears the weight of many of Rwanda’s development aspirations and keeping it secure 
and orderly is viewed as critical by the government. After examining the national and local 
processes  through  which the government  has aimed to achieve  ‘secure  urbanisation’,  we 
consider the potential longer-term implications of its urban development strategy. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Few  cities  in  history  have  undergone  such  rapid  population  growth  and  socio-economic 
change as Kigali since 1994. The statistics are astonishing: Kigali’s population approximately 
trebled between 1991 and 2001 (Oz Architecture et al., 2007, KC, 2009a) despite the death of 
around one million Rwandans in the civil war and genocide during that period. The country’s 
urban population growth rate soared to 18 per cent in the 1995–2000 period immediately 
following the genocide (UNPD, 2009), a rate that is virtually unprecedented anywhere in the 
world in the last 60 years.
1  
These rates of change would put states with even the most robust 
 
institutions  under  strain.  In  a  very  poor  country  where  infrastructure,  bureaucratic  state 
capacity and social fabric have all been ravaged by genocide and war, the challenge of coping 
with this degree of demographic and socio-economic change is almost unimaginable. 
 
As  the  introductory  article  and  other  papers  in  this  collection  demonstrate,  cities  often 
become sites of violence following civil war. Given the demographic pressures, poverty and 
social dislocation  faced by city dwellers  in Kigali – alongside  growing  inequality2   – one 
would expect it to be a prime candidate for this phenomenon. It was indeed characterised by 
strife and violence for several years after the genocide, while the country at large was still 
suffering from pervasive instability. However, after a few very difficult years Kigali swiftly 
became a regional anomaly characterised  by orderly urbanisation and low levels of crime, 
rather  than  becoming  a  space  of  endemic  violence  as  might  be  expected  given  the 
circumstances. In fact, a recent study of policing in Rwanda noted that the vast majority of 
Rwandans – city dwellers included – feel secure (Baker, 2007, p. 348). This is all the more 
remarkable given that, in the words of a senior Rwandan policeman, ‘Getting armed here is 
not hard considering our neighbouring countries!’ (Baker, 2007, p. 349). 
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This  paper  explores  the  question  of  why  Kigali  has  come  to  be  characterised  by  the 
conspicuous absence of violent conflict and disorder. We argue that urban policing is an 
insufficient  explanation;  a much broader and more contextualised  analysis is needed. This 
should take into account the consolidation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as a political 
organisation, the politics of its development agenda and relationship with the international 
community, and how these factors translate into urban change on the ground. Ultimately the 
government’s overriding concern with national security issues, combined with its need for 
legitimacy,  has led to sustained efforts to create a city that is tightly controlled through a 
range of strategies that project it as a ‘model’ space, both domestically and internationally. 
This has been facilitated by the dominance of RPF control in most spheres of life and the 
constriction of political space, which may have less positive implications for urban stability 
over the long term. 
 
Methodologically, the article therefore explores Kigali as a ‘deviant case’ (Gerring 2007) in 
relation  to  post-conflict  cities  in  the  developing  world  more  broadly.  The  narrative  we 
provide of Kigali as a unique post-conflict space since 1994 is based on semi-structured 
interviews with politicians, bureaucrats, international donors, foreign investors, ordinary 
residents and civic associations, as well as observation of urban activities and processes and 
analysis  of  government  statistics  and  donor  literature.  This  research  was  undertaken  at 
various points from January 2009 – December 2011. Due to the difficulty of undertaking 
research in Rwanda’s rather restrictive  political environment  (Swedlund,  Loyle and Smith 
2012), it was not possible to delve deeply into certain issues, particularly relating to the city’s 
current ethnic geography, and we have had to anonymise many interview sources.
3
 
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we present a basic introductory framework, drawing 
on  the  literature  on  cities,  security  and  conflict  to  illustrate  why  Kigali  constitutes  an 
important anomalous case. We then provide some historical background  and highlight the 
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severity of the challenges facing the city immediately after the 1994 genocide. Following this 
we place the city in international and national context, highlighting the role of international 
aid  in  Kigali’s  reconstruction  before  turning  to  the  way  in  which  the  RPF  consolidated 
political power and reframed state structures once the initial period of stabilisation was over. 
Against this backdrop we then focus on dynamics at the urban level, highlighting the role of 
the city Master Plan, the quest for urban investment and some of the local-level processes that 
that have worked to securitise the city. This leads us into a final section that evaluates the 
government’s   approach  to  managing  conflict  in  the  city  and  beyond,  and  what  the 
implications of this might be for future stability. 
 
 
 
Cities, violence and the urbanisation of security 
 
 
 
As the world urbanises, cities and their distinct socio-spatial characteristics are moving centre 
stage in discourses on conflict and post-war reconstruction (Graham 2004; Abrahamsen et al 
2009). Political conflict has been tentatively linked to urbanisation trends (Auvinen 1997; 
Goldstone 2002) and, in the words of Martin Coward, ‘a reciprocal dynamic of urban 
securitisation is under way in which the security agenda is urbanised and urbanity is – insofar 
as it induces insecurity and vulnerability – securitised’ (Coward 2009: 400). Cities are sites of 
critical  infrastructure,  making  them  pre-eminent  strategic  targets  in  inter-state  warfare 
(Coward 2009, Graham 2004). Meanwhile, even outside of war zones the prevalence of crime 
and  social  violence  in  many  developing  country  cities  is  giving  rise  to  new  policing 
technologies and perceptions of urban risk (Brennan-Galvin, 2002). 
 
This is not to say that cities are intrinsically violent spaces, and most long-term and large 
scale  civil  conflicts  are fought  in rural  areas  (Auvinen  1997),  rendering  cities  havens  of 
relative stability in civil war. Yet as this Special Issue has demonstrated, it is common for 
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cities to become sites of enduring  violence  after war has ended. Consequently  is it is no 
surprise   that   urban   security   is   seen   as   requiring   explicit   attention   in   post-conflict 
peacebuilding (Hills 2008). The fact that violence in urban areas can persist or even increase 
the wake of resolution to a national conflict has been observed in contexts such as Guatemala, 
el Salvador and Nicaragua (Pearce 1998; Rodgers 2009), as well as some of the cases in this 
Special Issue. 
 
For a number of reasons one might expect Kigali to have taken this path too. The city was 
devastated   by  the  war  and   genocide,   and  in  the  aftermath   was  subject   to  intense 
socioeconomic pressures and a severe shortage of housing and employment. As Goldstone 
(2002) notes, the risks of violent conflict are very high when population growth rates between 
different ethnic groups are unequal, and when urbanisation exceeds economic growth. Indeed 
the  risk  of  political  crisis  is  almost  double  in  countries  with  above  average  levels  of 
urbanisation but below average levels of GDP/capita (Goldstone 2002: 10). According to all 
these criteria, after 1994 Kigali was a city ripe for further conflict. However, after the initial 
period  of stabilisation  this outcome  was largely  avoided,  for reasons  that the subsequent 
sections aim to explain. First, we provide some background on the genocide and its impacts 
on the city. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Rwandan genocide and its aftermath in Kigali 
 
 
Present-day Rwanda has its roots in one of the ancient, hierarchically structured kingdoms of 
Africa’s  Great Lakes Region.  Over several centuries,  a distinction  between  Hutu 
agriculturalists and Tutsi cattle keepers evolved within the kingdom, becoming a rigid feature 
of  social  life  in  the  Belgian  colonial  period.
4    
Having  supported  the  Tutsi-dominated 
monarchy  through  colonialism,  at independence  the Belgians  shifted  their  support  to the 
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Hutus, who with 85 per cent of the population, were a clear majority (Reyntjens, 1985, 
Mamdani, 2001). This ushered in a period of Hutu dominance, from the violent upheaval of 
1959 – in which Tutsis were widely persecuted and many fled – to 1990, when a group of 
Tutsis who had been forced to spend their lives in exile launched a civil war from across the 
Ugandan border (Prunier, 1995, Waugh, 2004). 
 
The invading force, the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA), took control of part of the country’s 
territory, instilling panic and fear among the ruling Hutu elite. These circumstances played 
into the hands of a radical clique within the Hutu Power movement  known  as the akazu 
(‘little house’), who favoured the extermination of all Tutsis in Rwanda as a way of targeting 
the ‘enemy within’. Eventually, despite a UN presence hampered by a very limited mandate 
(Melvern, 2000, Dallaire, 2003), in April 1994 a campaign of genocide was unleashed that 
resulted in the slaughter of at least 500,000 Tutsis, and tens of thousands of moderate Hutus, 
in less than 100 days. It was only brought to a close when the RPA, led by Major-General 
Paul Kagame, finally won the civil war, taking Kigali on 8 July. Much has been written on 
these tragic events and their underlying causes elsewhere (Prunier, 1995, Gourevitch, 1998, 
Uvin, 1998, Des Forges, 1999, Mamdani, 2001, Jefremovas, 2002, Straus, 2006). 
 
Little has been written about the specific role of Kigali in Rwanda’s history. Under Belgian 
colonialism the city played a fairly minor role, and it was only with independence in 1962 
that Kigali became Rwanda’s capital, after which it grew at a steady pace, its population 
reaching around 200,000 by 1990 (KC, 2009a, UNPD, 2009). Even by then, however, it 
consisted largely of informal, densely packed shanty housing. In retrospect, people now often 
speak of Kigali before 1994 as being ‘really like a big village’,5  despite the many thousands 
 
of people there and the fact that it was the seat of government. 
 
 
In the final days of the battle for Kigali in summer 1994, the notorious RTLM radio station 
7  
urged all Hutus to flee the city, amid claims that on arrival the RPA would exterminate them. 
Many followed the remnants of the former government into Eastern Zaire (now DRC) 
(Gourevitch,  1998, Chrétien,  2003). Consequently,  when the RPA did march into the city 
they found a wasteland. Rose Kabuye, a senior military officer who became Kigali’s mayor 
immediately after the RPF took control, explains that ‘the city was deserted. When Kigali fell 
the streets were empty. The houses were empty apart from the survivors and the bodies and 
the dogs’.6 The genocide and closing months of the civil war had also left the city’s buildings 
 
and infrastructure devastated. 
 
 
Kigali and the ‘old caseload’ returnees 
 
 
The emptiness did not last long. Survivors soon came out of hiding and populated the city  as 
did large numbers of Tutsis who had been living in exile since the early anti-Tutsi pogroms of 
1959–1964, or who had been born in exile, often persecuted and dreaming of a ‘home’ they 
had never seen (Newbury, 2005). People arrived within weeks in vast numbers from 
neighbouring  countries, occupying the empty houses they found. As Kabuye notes, it was 
‘like random settlement. People would just open a house and go in, and stay in. Because there 
was nowhere else you could put them’.7Approximately  700,000 former exiles, often termed 
‘old caseload’  refugees,  returned  to Rwanda  at this time (Newbury,  2005, p. 277). Many 
came to Kigali, which was considered a site of security when many parts of the country were 
still unstable. Kigali in late 1994 was thus a city inhabited largely by traumatised genocide 
survivors and people who had hardly set foot in the country until that year, the majority of 
whom were living in the houses of unknown city dwellers who had died or fled. 
 
Individuals associated with the RPA were a logical human resource pool for reconstruction 
efforts  and  although  a  multi-party  Government  of  National  Unity  was  established,  the 
informal networks of the RPF – the political manifestation of the RPA – were central to how 
8  
the government functioned in reality (Prunier, 1995, p. 369). As well as having privileged 
access to government positions, many ‘old caseload’ returnees brought with them economic 
resources to establish businesses in Kigali.
8  
English-speakers  who had come from Uganda 
were particularly well-placed to engage with the international donor agencies and NGOs that 
flooded the city. 
 
Despite the vast challenges faced in the first year or so after the genocide, Kigali was soon to 
face even greater problems. Debates began over how to handle the problem of having up to a 
third  of  Rwanda’s  population  –  two  million  people  –  sitting  in  refugee  camps  outside 
Rwanda’s  borders,  mainly  in  the  Goma  region  of  the  DRC.  The  enormous  problems 
associated with these camps – and the international community’s failure to demilitarise them 
– have been well documented (Gourevitch, 1998, Uvin, 1998, Pottier, 1996, 2002, Chrétien, 
 
2003,  Rugumamu  and  Gbla,  2003,  Prunier,  2008).  Scaremongering  among  Hutu  Power 
leaders in the camps militated against refugees returning voluntarily (Gourevitch, 1998), 
resulting in the RPF’s decision to invade the camps in the DRC and pursue a strategy of 
forced repatriation on a massive scale in late 1996 (Newbury, 2005). 
 
The challenge of integrating the survivors and ‘new caseload’ refugees 
 
 
The return of approximately two million ‘new caseload’ refugees at this time was another 
tectonic shift in a deeply traumatised country. For the Hutus who fled in 1994, their forced 
return two years later was to a country in which they were now tainted by a presumed 
association  with  genocide.  Many  chose  to  head  to  Kigali  due  to  the  relative  anonymity 
afforded  by  the  large-city  context,
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or  to  reclaim  properties  they  rightfully  owned,  even 
 
though these were now being inhabited by other people – many of whom were genocide 
survivors.  This proved one of the greatest challenges  of the mid-to-late  1990s. When the 
owners returned, and the government instituted rules of restitution of properties for returnees, 
9  
the survivors were (unsurprisingly) ‘not happy with the message’ they were getting: 
 
 
They were saying ‘these people killed us, destroyed our property, and 
you are telling me to get out of his house?’ Those were some of the 
arguments, and the arguments were pertinent… It took three to five 
years to completely sort it out. This was a bad period for Rwanda.
10
 
 
 
If the house in question was big enough, the returning owners agreed to share with the current 
inhabitants, which was of course far from ideal.
11 
Meanwhile, the government faced repeated 
crises of legitimacy and security. From 1995 onwards high-profile sackings of ministers 
occurred in the face of disputes over how to deal with incursions from the DRC, internal 
security issues and the violent closure of refugee camps within Rwanda (Prunier, 1995, Des 
Forges, 1999, Reyntjens, 2004).
12  
Instability from 1996-98, marked by gunshots and crime 
related to property disputes, was largely handled through the use of aggressive community- 
 
based policing, given the absence of a coherent police force (Baker, 2007, Prunier, 2008). 
 
 
By 2000, Kigali was no longer in any sense like a ‘village’. Both its population and its built- 
up geographical area were over three times larger than in the mid-1980s (Oz Architecture et 
al.,  2007,  KC,  2009a).  As well as its increased  size,  the other characteristic  qualities  of 
‘urbanism’ – density and heterogeneity (Wirth, 1938) – were omnipresent, sometimes in an 
extreme  form  that  literally  meant  the  sharing  of  houses  by  genocide  perpetrators  and 
genocide survivors. Moreover, by the end of the decade tensions were also evident between 
genocide survivors and Tutsi returnees, due to feelings of exclusion and lack of redress on the 
part of the former (Reyntjens, 2004). In all, there was little to hold the social fabric of the city 
together and plenty of reason to expect persistent violent civic conflict, to characterise Kigali 
in the early twenty-first century. 
 
Yet, against the odds, Kigali took a rather different path. Early in the 2000s the police were 
10  
consolidated into a professional, disciplined and remarkably small force – only 800 for a city 
of a million inhabitants (Baker, 2007) – and the use of overt violence by the government 
substantially reduced. In this period Kigali rapidly cemented a reputation as one of the safest 
cities in the region and in 2008 was awarded a UN-HABITAT Scroll of Honour Award for 
‘many innovations in building a model, modern city’ accompanied by a substantial reduction 
in  crime.
13   
High  levels  of  civic  order  have  therefore  been  effectively  maintained  in  the 
absence of an overwhelming police presence. In attempting to explain this, we now turn to 
the question of how state power under the RPF has been reconstituted, with the support of 
international donors, before looking at Kigali’s central role in this process. 
 
 
 
 
 
City of aid: post-genocide Kigali as a hub for international resource inflows 
 
 
Donor guilt over failure to intervene and prevent the genocide contributed to an outpouring of 
funding  from  the  international  community  once  the  RPF  took  power  (Hayman,  2007, 
Beswick, 2010). Between April and December 1994 US$1.4 billion in emergency assistance 
was targeted at Rwanda and approximately 200 NGOs were involved at this time, working in 
Rwanda, Tanzania and the refugee camps in eastern DRC (RRN, 1996, p. 3). For a long time, 
far more foreign aid – around US$1 million per day even a year-and-a-half after the genocide 
(RRN, 1996, p. 13) – was directed to these camps than to Rwanda, creating major tensions 
between donors and the RPF (Rugumamu  and Gbla, 2003, Hayman,  2009). As it became 
evident  that  the  donor  community  was  indirectly  funding  elements  associated  with  the 
genocidal former regime via the camps, the RPF-led government began gaining the moral 
imperative, which laid the foundations for Rwanda’s subsequent strategy in its engagement 
with donors over the longer term. 
 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s the RPF achieved a new credibility internationally  and 
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donors began to target increasing amounts of financial resources directly at the government, 
with the UK leading the way by providing general budget support from 2000 (Purcell et al., 
2006). The RPF was able to utilise what some observers term ‘genocide credit’ (Reyntjens, 
 
2004) to exert considerable  influence,  skilfully  appealing  to the donor community’s  need 
both to atone for their failures in 1994 and to find an aid-supported ‘African success story’. 
Improvement on development indicators, such as female representation in government or 
increased health and education coverage, helped convey to the development community that 
the RPF was taking positive steps to improve Rwanda’s future. 
 
The RPF’s increasing leverage is evident, for example, in relation to housing policies. In the 
late  1990s  the government  instituted  a villagisation  programme,  ‘imidugudu’,  in order to 
ensure security and the productive use of land throughout the country, as well as addressing 
housing shortages including in the areas around Kigali.
14 
At this time donors were heavily 
financing  housing  refurbishment,  but  the  government  was  able  to  persuade  many  that 
imidugudu was a greater priority, suggesting that donors were increasingly open to taking 
direction from the government  (Human Rights Watch, 2001, p. 15). Meanwhile ambitious 
statements  of  developmental  intent  such  as  Rwanda  Vision  2020  were  published  (RoR 
Ministry  of  Finance  and  Economic  Planning,  2000),  which  envisaged  a  leading  role  for 
Kigali in the development of sectors such as financial services and ICT. 
 
Aid to Rwanda reached almost US$1 billion annually in 2010 (MINECOFIN, 2010, p. 1) and 
the government’s relative competence in financial management and combating corruption has 
ensured  that  levels  remain  very  high  even  compared  to  other  conflict-afflicted  countries 
(OECD, 2010, p. 65). From 1999-2009 aid as a percentage of GNI was among the highest in 
Africa at around19 per cent (OECD DAC, 2010). Over time, increasing amounts of aid were 
provided in the form of general budget support, which comprised 34 per cent of Rwanda’s 
total aid by 2004 (Purcell et al., 2006, p. 14) and was aimed at supporting ‘the Government’s 
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own  policy  issues’  (DFID,  2000).    This  makes  it  difficult  to track,  especially  given  the 
problem of aid fungibility.
15
 
 
There are a number of reasons why all this matters in terms of the trajectory of Kigali as a 
city. While most aid is not targeted specifically towards urban issues, it is impossible to 
understand  Kigali’s  evolution  without  due  attention  to  the  vast  sums  of  foreign  money 
flowing through the city. Aid played a direct role in the early reconstruction of Kigali, when 
urban infrastructure accounted for up to 40 per cent of capital expenditure (Uvin, 1998, p. 
149). Donors such as the World Bank also funded major infrastructure projects in the 2000s 
such  as  the  $23.7m  Urban  Infrastructure  and  City  Management  Project  (Projet 
D’Infrastructure  et de Gestion Urbaine, or ‘PIGU’), much of which was focused on local 
roads and drainage in some low income areas of Kigali.
16
 
 
 
However, the real significance of aid for Kigali relates not to programme expenditure but to 
more indirect and intangible effects. First, through providing substantial budget support and 
international  legitimacy it has arguably strengthened  the hold of the RPF on the political 
arena and indirectly supported the deep penetration of society by party structures; something 
that has enabled it to exert control over the city in ways that are explored further below. 
Second and related, the resources flowing into Kigali have surely helped bolster its status as 
elite space  that stands  out from the rest of the country in socioeconomic  terms.  Kigali’s 
poverty headcount stood at just 13% in 2006 compared with 57% nationally. This relatively 
low figure was not simply a matter of ‘urban bias’ but specific to Kigali: Rwanda’s other 
major urban centres, Gitarama and Butare, had remarkably high poverty headcounts at 56.5% 
and 70% respectively (RoR, 2007). Moreover, analysis of data on vehicle ownership from 
2009 shows that 66% of private vehicles in the country were registered to people in Kigali 
despite the fact the city constituted only 10% of the population; and of the 33,544 vehicles 
registered in the city it is telling that almost half were large ‘jeeps’ or ‘pickups’.
17
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Finally,  the  volume  of  aid  has  also  resulted  in  the  heavy  presence  of  the  international 
community in the city, in the form of NGO and aid workers, something discussed further 
below.  In sum, aid has arguably  helped consolidate  RPF rule and cemented  the status of 
Kigali as a space for both domestic and international elites, all of which has important 
implications for Kigali’s securitisation. We now turn to the arena of domestic political 
consolidation, before expanding further on some of the ways both national and international 
dynamics have impacted at the city level. 
 
 
 
 
 
The consolidation of RPF power in the domestic political arena 
 
 
2000 was something of a turning point in Rwanda. Internal rifts within the government came 
to a head, resulting in multiple resignations by frontline politicians including the titular 
President, Pasteur Bizimungu, and the ascent of Kagame to the presidency (Reyntjens, 2004, 
Lemarchand, 2007).  In many ways, this set the stage for Rwanda’s future political context. 
With  many  internal  rivals  gone,  the  government’s  clarity  of  vision  further  crystallised, 
enabling it to push forward with a number of changes in the sphere of governance and politics 
alongside its development agenda. Among the changes at the political level has been the 
proliferation of legislation on ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ since 2001, which is 
interpreted with considerable flexibility and has expanded the government’s legal powers to 
constrain  criticism  (Human  Rights  Watch,   2008).  These  measures   have  led  to  tight 
restrictions  on  political  dissent  resulting  in  a  process  of  political  consolidation  that  has 
granted the RPF significant power.  The negative implications for political space and freedom 
of expression have been widely noted (Reyntjens, 2004, 2010, Lemarchand, 2007, Beswick, 
2010; Straus and Waldorf 2011). Moreover, with particular relevance to the securitisation of 
 
Kigali, this has helped to inculcate a culture of community ‘self-policing’ as part of a wider 
14 
 
anxiety about staying on the right side of the law (Baker, 2007, Beswick, 2010). 
 
 
Around the same time, the government began to implement its decentralisation programme, 
which – framed largely in technical terms – was welcomed and supported by donors. 
Decentralisation  in Rwanda  was  designed  as a three-phase  project  starting  in 2000.  The 
second phase of decentralisation from 2005 began with a re-districting exercise: Rwanda now 
has just five provinces – one of which is the Kigali City (KC) – and thirty districts, three of 
which are in KC. In turn, the three districts are divided into 32 sectors, which are divided into 
161  cells,  which  in  turn  are  subdivided   into  1,061  imidugudu
18    
(KC,  2009a).  Each 
 
umudugudu,  the smallest  formal  unit of government,  consists  of around  100 households, 
below which an informal ‘nyumbacumi’ position also exists, consisting of an individual 
responsible  for  overseeing  10  households  (Human  Rights  Watch,  2008,  p.  20).  This 
remarkable  level  of  societal  penetration  by  the  state  has  long  historical  antecedents  in 
Rwanda  (Mamdani,  2001,  Chrétien,  2003,  Straus,  2006).  However,  decentralisation  has 
resulted in the formal transfer of certain resources and powers downwards, giving the 
administrative arrangement both new strengths and a new legitimacy. 
 
Rwandan officials note that a central aim of decentralisation  was to move away from the 
 
‘culture of obedience’ that was prevalent under the previous regime.19  The extent to which 
this is actually happening is, however, uncertain. In lower tiers of government and society 
alike a strong tendency to defer to authority remains deeply ingrained and it is not clear that 
decentralisation is changing this. The fact that RPF party structures closely mirror those of 
the state, with the boundaries between the two sometimes being blurred (Purdeková, 2011) 
contributes  to this.    In contrast  to the  above  claim  of  increased  local  autonomy,  people 
working at the city level and below make statements to the effect that Rwanda’s progress ‘all 
comes  from  high  office’,  ‘when  government  decides,  we  follow’  and  ‘if  they  say,  you 
obey’.
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Decentralisation  thus  often  functions  as  a  way  to  administer  governmental  mandates  to 
citizens  and  supervise  local  activity.  This  is  epitomised  by  the  ‘imihigo’,  which  are 
‘traditional’  performance  contracts  between  tiers  of  government  whereby  local  leaders 
commit to delivering certain results in a given period (KC, 2009b). More generally, the 
prevalence of ‘sensitisation’ – a term used repeatedly by interviewees of all kinds to describe 
how community  members  learn about  policy  directives  from the government  – has been 
central to how decentralisation functions in practice (see also Purdeková, 2011). With regard 
to Kigali specifically, a 2006 law effectively re-established the city government as an arm of 
the central state at the city level, coordinating the three districts within it rather than forming 
a distinct decentralised  tier in its own right (Law No. 10/2006).
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The city’s leadership is 
 
generally drawn from the inner circles of the RPF, something evident since the time of Rose 
Kabuye but also in relation to her successors James Musoni and Theoneste Mutsindashyaka, 
who have also been frontline ministers in the national cabinet. 
 
In all, it appears that decentralisation has ultimately strengthened the RPF and expanded its 
room for manoeuvre in the city, particularly given the restrictions on local-level campaigning 
by  political  parties.
22   
In  this  respect  there  are  few  political  obstacles  to  the  RPF  elite 
promoting and implementing its desired vision for the capital. It is to this that we now turn, 
 
considering first the role of the city Master Plan in promoting a particular model of urban 
development, and second the drive towards highly structured forms of social organisation in 
the  city.  The  government’s  deep  commitment  to  both  these  issues  has proved  potent  in 
relation to Kigali’s securitisation. 
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The ‘model city’ as developmental and political project 
 
 
 
The Master Plan and the city as a haven for investment 
 
 
Kigali  is central  to the government’s  aspirations  of  Rwanda  becoming  an ICT,  financial 
services and logistics hub for the East/Central African region, and thereby moving beyond aid 
dependency. In 2007 the government published the city’s Conceptual Master Plan, designed 
by consultants from the USA and Singapore at a cost of US$1.7 million (Oz Architecture et 
al.).  The  Master  Plan  embodies  the  government’s  emphasis  over  the past  decade  on  the 
creation of a city that is a paragon of environmental conservation, public order and social 
harmony  and  –  related  to  this  –  an  ideal  site  for  investors.  The  plan  wields  enormous 
influence: one interviewee even commented that ‘[we] are all impaled on the Master Plan.
23
 
 
 
The Plan is explicitly geared towards transforming Kigali into a sort of ‘model’ city to attract 
those seeking a safe investment in East and Central Africa. This transformation is already 
under way, with wetland clearances and proposed business districts motivating large-scale 
expropriations of informal settlements, the inhabitants of which have in many cases had to 
relocate to imidugudu settlements outside the city due to a lack of formal housing in Kigali.
24
 
 
Illustrating the severity of the housing shortage in the face of urban growth, the Rwandan 
Development Board has indicated that there is demand for an estimated 8,000-10,000 housing 
units in Kigali annually.
25  
These targets are nowhere near being met, particularly  when it 
comes to low-income housing. 
The donor community has not been directly involved with the implementation of the Master 
Plan  and  the  plan  itself  was  purportedly  paid  for  entirely  with  the  government’s  own 
resources.
26  
However, it is difficult to identify whether resources facilitating the plan’s 
implementation originate from tax collection or general budget support from donors.  Some 
donors and other sources working for international organisations in the city expressed overt 
17  
scepticism about the plan, suggesting it was an elite-driven project with little clear relevance 
for poverty reduction.
27    
This in part reflects on-going tension between donors and the 
government about whether they should focus more on agricultural productivity than on grand, 
urban-based projects, although – in the words of a Rwandan minister remarking on this 
disagreement – ‘we don’t listen to them anyway; that is the beauty of Rwanda’.28 
 
Even  though  implementation  of  the  plan  is  only  in  its  early  stages,  the  drive  to  attract 
investment is a powerful motivation for the government to create a secure environment with 
the appearance of minimal risk. In sectors such as tourism, finance, energy and 
telecommunications,   the  government  is  making  headway  in  attracting  investment  from 
countries ranging from Canada to the UAE to China (IPAR 2011).   The commitment to a 
secure and planned city, along with anti-corruption agendas, also provides a very appealing 
environment for donors to operate in. An expatriate presence composed of both investors and 
donors increases the market for upscale properties, restaurants, cafés and shops, which in turn 
are appealing to potential investors in services. 
 
It is, however, important to note that much of the investment in property and construction that 
is  reshaping  Kigali  comes  from  domestic  rather  than  foreign  sources.  Indeed  73%  of 
registered investment from the top ten domestic investors in 2006-10 was in property/real 
estate or construction (IPAR 2011). This has been financed in part by the national pension 
programme,
29   
as  well  as  by  the  controversial  RPF-owned  investor  Crystal  Ventures  Ltd 
 
(formerly Tri-Star), Horizon Group (which emerged directly from the Ministry of Defence) 
 
and the Rwanda Investment Group, all of which are explicitly involved in construction.
30
 
 
 
Meanwhile  certain  parts  of  the  city  that  were  just  ‘bush’  prior  to  1994  are  now  highly 
developed  and  reputedly  largely  populated  by  elites;  one  neighbourhood  in  particular  is 
referred to by some expatriates as ‘Tutsi town’ or, in the more guarded words of an ordinary 
18 
 
Kigali resident, there are ‘no enemies’ there, it being a place where ‘people support each 
other’ and ‘people look the same’.31  The development of these areas, often far from the city 
centre, has also had the effect of de-densifying the city even as its population grows (Oz 
Architecture 2007: 19), heightening socioeconomic segregation. These  major investments in 
property by domestic elites in the city – considered by some observers to be financed though 
dealings in the neighbouring DRC
32  
– provides yet further incentives to keep the city secure. 
Indeed  the  RPF’s  very  public  drive  to  attract  foreign  investment  and  its  more  private 
imperative to protect ongoing domestic investments work together to incentivise urban 
securitisation. 
 
Engineering ‘secure urbanisation’ against the odds 
 
 
The government has found a number of ways to achieve the secure and orderly development 
it considers  so central to its development  objectives  and political  survival.  There  is little 
doubt that this is a priority, with one minister acknowledging ‘a big danger if the future if the 
question  [of  urban  settlements]  is  not  addressed’,  due  to  the  potential  for  ‘social  and 
economic insecurity.’33  As previously noted, the nature of policing underlines the puzzle of 
 
Kigali’s low levels of crime, given the small size of the force and its total in 2006 of just 12 
patrol vehicles (Baker, 2007, p. 352). They are backed by Kigali’s District Defence Force, 
which numbers around a thousand and supports the police through such activities as rounding 
up street hawkers, but this force has strictly limited powers.
34
 
 
 
Various informal security arrangements also exist, whereby residents pay a small fee to their 
umudugudu  and  local  youths  patrol  the  area  at  night.
35   
Yet  securitisation  runs  deeper, 
pervading  everyday  economic  life. The state’s  approach  to the conscious  organisation  of 
urban  social  and  economic  activity  has  been  critical  here,  particularly  given  the  large 
numbers of unemployed  youth present in the city after the genocide.
36  ‘Mobilising’  those 
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working in the urban informal economy into cooperatives  and associations  has resulted in 
such a dramatic decrease in visible informal actors in Kigali’s streets over the past decade 
that ‘donors have been hunting to see where they are gone’, explains one cabinet minister.37 
Also important has been the voluntary public works day, umuganda, which all citizens are 
 
strongly encouraged to attend and which plays an important role both in relation to the 
government’s  local  development  plans  and  also  facilitates  security  through  knowledge- 
sharing and ‘checking on one’s neighbour’. 38 
 
The emphasis on order and urban reorganisation to some degree parallels the rural social 
engineering discussed elsewhere (see e.g. Ansoms (2008); Straus and Waldorf (2011). The 
functioning  of  Kigali’s  urban  associations  is clearly  linked  to  security  and  ultimately  to 
political imperatives. All urban cooperatives have within them a strict hierarchy and a city- 
wide security architecture, which is largely geared towards internal discipline and which, 
according to one such security officer, is effectively ‘under police control’ despite a degree of 
autonomy.
39   
These forms of association  effectively  limit the capacity for urban groups to 
 
organise in ways that might be politically more threatening to the government. They partly 
account for the absence of overt state-society conflict, but also reflect the constraints on civil 
society in Kigali. 
 
The urban transport sector provides a particularly striking example. In the 1990s and 2000s 
the  ‘taxi-moto’  (motorcycle  taxi)  industry  grew  apace  in  Kigali,  and  this  soon  became 
associated with theft, drugs and ‘disorganisation’ among urban youth. The government 
responded by introducing strict regulations and a security department within the taxi-moto 
association itself, as well as encouraging them to undertake ‘voluntary’ work such as planting 
trees and building houses for genocide survivors.
40
. A problematic industry was thus turned 
to the government’s advantage, incorporating the motorcyclists into city surveillance 
mechanisms and local development plans. This approach taken towards many other areas of 
20 
 
urban  informal  activity  is  similar.  Informal  street  trade  and  informal  settlements  are 
considered   ‘security   issues’.41    Moreover,   having   ushered   in  this  urban   stability,   the 
motivation  for  sustaining  it  is  powerful:  Kigali’s  status  as  a  successful  post-conflict 
development story is itself a political resource that the government draws on for legitimacy 
and credibility at home and abroad. 
 
 
 
 
 
Tensions beneath the surface of a fragile urban order 
 
 
There are of course dissenting voices when it comes to the government’s vision for Kigali 
and the manner of its implementation. The expropriations in the name of the Master Plan 
discussed earlier have proved highly controversial, and the relative absence of social violence 
in the city should not obscure the use of actual or threatened violence by the state in relation 
to  these  kinds  of  state-society  interactions.
42   
By  2011  the  government  had  decided  to 
 
temporarily halt the process until the desired investment to develop the already-expropriated 
areas was in place, for fear of stimulating discontent.
43  
There is little doubt that life is already 
very difficult for the urban poor due to the strict constraints on informal economic activity; 
one non-government source claimed that ‘the way the plan is moving, poor people are being 
eliminated’ from the city,
44 
and even a government minister conceded that many poor people 
 
leave because ‘life is almost impossible for low earners in Kigali’.45 
 
 
Moreover, despite the securitisation of the city there are clear reasons to believe that divisions 
continue to characterise Rwandan society. Bitter disputes over the ownership of plots of land 
in Kigali still persist, which according to one local politician are by far the most challenging 
aspect of the job.
46  
Evidence  also indicates  that genocide  survivors  feel neglected  by the 
 
state.
47   
It is also important  not to suggest  that the relative  absence  of violent  crime  and 
conflict in the public sphere translates into the private; levels of rape and sexual violence 
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remain very high (Baker, 2007, p. 349). Meanwhile, the on-going process of trying genocide 
perpetrators  through  the  controversial   gacaca  community  courts  reveals  the  depth  of 
continuing ethnic divisions, and reconciliation between perpetrators and survivors is a long 
way off even according to observers who generally view the trials favourably (Clark 2010). 
 
That social divisions should still run deep is hardly surprising.  Yet they are only aired in 
certain circumscribed fora such as gacaca, which was designed to deal with past grievances 
and not present concerns; discussion of ethnicity is only acceptable in relation to the past, if 
at  all.    The  government’s  discourses  about  unity,  order  and  appropriate  ‘mindsets’48   – 
combined of course with strict laws on divisionism – have imposed clear and controversial 
constraints  on  public  debate  about  Rwanda’s  present  (Beswick,  2010).  This  raises  the 
question of how the more everyday conflicts and antagonisms that form part of urban life are 
to be aired. The limited space for debate could be driving both social antagonisms and 
grievances against the state under the surface rather than channelling them upwards in way 
that offer the potential to fuel social development. After all, urban transformation ultimately 
requires ‘dissensus’ – ‘focused disagreement on how best to allocate public resources across 
space…and time’ (Pieterse 2008: 156). 
 
Adversarial political engagement represents a threat to the order the state has so effectively 
established, and a threat to order is seen as a threat to security. Given Rwanda’s history, these 
concerns  are  understandable.  However,  the  implications  of  such  constraints  in  an  urban 
setting merit consideration:  social conflict does not simply evaporate, especially in diverse 
and highly unequal cities. The strong belief in Rwanda that ‘things have to go well in the city 
first’,49   due  to  Kigali’s  visibility  and  its  demonstration  effect  for  the  broader  country, 
 
‘overdetermines’ the city (Esser, this volume) in an unusual sense. The government’s 
determination  that Kigali should be a model of peaceful development  could have dubious 
implications for future stability if adequate channels for civic engagement are not in place. 
22  
Research presented elsewhere in this volume indicates that things can also often go badly in 
the city first, especially in post-conflict settings. 
 
The possibility that conflicts beneath the surface of Kigali’s fragile security and order are 
simply being suppressed or ‘deferred’ rather than addressed, due to the lack of adequate 
channels  for expression  of grievances,  should  therefore  not  be discounted.  The  series  of 
grenade attacks in Kigali prior to the 2010 election, and more sporadically in 2011 and 2012, 
would seem to suggest this possibility.
50  
Social conflicts can sometimes dissipate over time, 
 
particularly with rising prosperity and development; but this usually takes generations. Given 
the short time frames Rwanda is working with and the nature of the political environment, the 
possibility of deferral rather than dissipation is difficult to ignore. 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This paper has analysed Kigali’s transformation from a space of post-conflict trauma and 
instability to an internationally acclaimed ‘model’ of orderly and peaceful development; a 
trajectory that has differed widely from most post-conflict urban settings.   We have argued 
that the consolidation of political control by the RPF both nationally and locally, alongside a 
developmental agenda predicated on attracting investment and integrating the population into 
the re-ordering of the city socially and economically, transformed urban security in ways that 
exceeded  expectations  for post-conflict  cities.  Both  donor  relations  and domestic  politics 
have  allowed  the  country’s  leaders  to  operate  in  a  relatively  unconstrained  manner  in 
designing and implementing an urban vision of their choosing. In other countries, where 
opposition parties are in power at the city level and/or governments have less leverage vis-à- 
vis donors,  institutional  conflict  and fragmentation  can  hinder  this  kind  of  radical  urban 
reorganisation  and often leave the city as a site of enduring  violence  after war, as other 
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articles in this volume suggest. 
 
 
However, while Kigali has largely served as a post-conflict urban anomaly up to this point in 
time, there is no guarantee that this dynamic is necessarily sustainable.  On the one hand, the 
city’s trajectory represents a remarkable success story: Kigali’s experience has demonstrated 
how  centralised  policy-making   and  implementation,   political  determination   and  donor 
support can help to ensure security and urban modernisation to take place in an extremely 
complex post-genocidal context. The city’s progress on these fronts is an internal symbol of 
national  regeneration  as  well  as  a  sign  to  the  international  community  of  the  country’s 
progress  and  its  suitability  as  a  site  for  much  needed  foreign  resources.  Yet  the chosen 
political mode for overcoming a history of catastrophic interpersonal violence has not been 
without problems of its own, and may be obstructing certain critical conversations relating to 
past  grievances  and  present  demands.  The  question  remains  whether  Kigali  really  is  a 
‘model’ of development broadly conceived, rather than just a model of order. Indeed, while 
security  and  planning  are  important  preconditions   for  development,   a  country  facing 
Rwanda’s population pressure and urbanisation trajectory needs cities that can also include 
people politically and provide substantial new economic opportunities for the poor. So long 
as a fundamental fragility underpins the political system and the development vision for the 
city offers little for those on low incomes, the sustainability of Kigali’s impressive levels of 
security and stability should not be taken for granted. 
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1 According to UN statistics, the only time a (marginally) higher growth rate has been seen anywhere since 1950 
was in Western Sahara in the late 1970s (UNPD, 2009). 
2 
Rwanda’s Gini coefficient increased from 0.47 around the turn of the millennium to 0.51 in 2006 (RoR, 2007). 
3    
While ethnicity remains a critical factor in contemporary  Rwanda,  overt discussion  of it in public is very 
limited.  Newbury and Baldwin for example highlighted this as an issue back in 2000 (Newbury and Baldwin: 5) 
and more recent legal frameworks in Rwanda which criminalize ‘divisionism’ have made research on ethnicity 
even  more  difficult.   While  the  law  is  vague  regarding  the  exact  parameters  of  ‘divisionism’  (Amnesty 
International:  15), in practice,  it means that people are reticent to speak overtly about the subject.  Statistical 
data on ethnic factors are also significantly more limited now than in the past as indicated by a lack of ethnicity 
indicators  in recent census or Demographic  and Health Survey reports (for example see NISR 2010).   Given 
these limitations, it was not possible to delve into issues of ethnicity within the confines of this research, beyond 
some anecdotal evidence presented later in the paper. 
 
4 
Note that the question of when exactly this distinction first appeared, and the degree to which it was introduced 
by the Belgians, is a subject of much debate (Mamdani, 2001, Chrétien, 2003). 
5 
Interview with Rose Kabuye, 12 February 2010. Other interviewees gave similar characterisation of the city. 
6 Interview with Rose Kabuye, 12 February 2010. Kabuye is reputed to have been close to Kagame during the 
war years (Prunier, 2008, p. 44), and along with other leading women such as Aloisea Inymba is also something 
of a symbol of the important role women played in the RPF struggle (Powley, 2006, p. 5). 
7 
Interview with Rose Kabuye, 12 February 2010. 
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8 
Interview with government official 13 February 2009. 
9 
Interview with local government official, 25 February 2009. 
10 Interview with Rose Kabuye, 12 February 2010. 
11 
Interview with Rose Kabuye, 12 February 2010. 
12 
Much has been written on the massacre of thousands that accompanied the closure of the Kibeho camp in 
1995 (Gourevitch, 1998, Prunier, 2008), causing some donors to temporarily withhold aid (Hayman, 2007, p. 
13). 
13 
http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?typeid=19&catid=564&cid=5666,  accessed 27 April 2011. 
14 
For critical perspectives on this policy see Ansoms (2008) and various chapters in Straus and Waldorf (2011). 
15 
Fungibility relates to the basic question of whether recipients allocate aid in the way donors intended 
(McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000). If the aid is funding something that the government would have paid for 
anyway, then it allows the government to divert the resources it would have used for that purpose to other ends. 
16 
Notes from attendance by one of the authors in the closing workshop of PIGU, 14 December 2009. 
17 
Figures obtained on vehicle registration from the Rwanda Revenue Authority, February 2009. 
18 This term refers to the village level of governance. ‘Umudugudu’ is the singular and ‘imidugudu’ the plural. 
19 
Interview, 19 February 2009. The idea that such a ‘culture’ has characterised Rwanda since pre-colonial times 
has been widely discussed (Prunier, 1995, Gourevitch, 1998, Mamdani, 2001, Straus, 2006). 
20 
Interviews with local government sources, 16–17 February 2009. 
21 Law No. 10/2006 of 03/03/2006, Determining the Structure, Organization, and the Functioning of the City of 
Kigali. 
22 
These restrictions are enshrined in the 2003 Constitution. They were formally lifted in 2007, but this does not 
seem to have changed much in practice (Beswick, 2010, p. 234). 
23 Interview with government official, 19 February 2009. 
24 
See Goodfellow (2012a) for a fuller discussion of the expropriations. 
25 
RDB Website http://www.rdb.rw/rdb/real-estate.html, accessed 29 May 2012. 
26 
Interview with KC official, 15 February 2009. 
27 Interview with UN advisors, 4 February 2010; interview with donor representative, 14 December 2009 
28 
Interview with government minister, 9 December 2009. 
29 
Interview with Fred Rwihunda, Director of Real Estate, Caisse Sociale de Rwanda, 2 February 2010. 
30 
For a discussion of the role of these investors in Rwanda’s development see Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 
(2011) 
31 
Interview with former RPA soldier and street hawker, 8 February 2010. 
32 
Interviews with foreign investors, November 2009-February 2010. 
33 
Interview with Vincent Karega, Minister of Infrastructure, 9 December 2009 
34 Interview with KC official, February 2010. 
35 
Interview with Kigali residents and local finance official, December 2011. 
36 
Note that in Rwanda ‘youth’ is a broad category encompassing people aged 14–35. 
37 
Interview with Vincent Karega, Minister of Infrastructure, 9 December 2009. 
38 Interview with a Rwandan researcher, 18 November 2009. 
39 
Interview with security officer from a transport cooperative, 7 December 2009. 
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40 
See Goodfellow (2012b) for a further discussion of this sector. 
41 
Various interviews with KC officials, November-December  2009. 
42 Interview with land specialist, 24 February 2009; interview with civil society source, 3 February 2010. 
43 
Interview with city planner, 6 December 2011. 
44 
Interview with civil society source, 3 February 2010. 
45 
Interview with Vincent Karega, Minister of Infrastructure, 9 December 2009. 
46 Interview with former local politician, 15 December 2009. 
47 
Interview with local civil society organisation, 11 December 2009. 
48 
One government advisor noted in an informal conversation that ‘transforming mindsets’ was of concern to the 
President. 
49 Interview with government official, 9 February 2009. 
50 
Responsibility for these attacks has not been resolved. 
